and substantive adjudicatory features and to reinforce links between constituencies of tribunal users.
These clusters are taking shape at a time when tribunal system restructuring has emerged as a priority in several Commonwealth countries. Compared to recent changes in the UK and to widespread tribunal amalgamations in Australia at both federal and State levels, Ontario's clustering model offers a unique strategy for reformbut one for which the long-term vision remains unclear, or at least it appears to be incomplete. In this paper we explore the resulting gaps and uncertainties in this strategy. Using modernisation efforts in Australia and the UK as a counterpoint, we argue that Ontario's strategy is founded on a distinctive idea of institutional change designed to make the tribunal system flexible, more adaptive and thus progressively more effective at delivering administrative justice services to its users. That said, tribunal clusters in our view represent an important step but not a final destination.
The need for such change is evident. Claimants who come to administrative tribunals in Canada, as elsewhere, expecting a convenient forum to resolve their problems may discover that institutional resources and expertise, their own knowledge of the system, and their statutory entitlements and legal rights are fragmented between bodies with diverse norms and mandates. At least from a birdseye view, the tribunal 'system' now looks more like an ad hoc assortment of isolated institutions rather than a coherent system of justice. Increasingly, it seems that the very structures and modes of organisation behind the delivery of administrative justice may actually pose barriers for users, even as they separate individual tribunals from the shared knowledge, practices and infrastructure that a more rational and explicitly coordinated administrative justice system would have to offer. The challenge now squarely in front of reformers is to identify suitable approaches to institutional change that will thread these disparate elements into a more coherent whole.
That challenge is also a reflection of broader trends in the shifting context of modern governance. As Andrew Gamble and Robert Thomas have recently observed in the UK: 4 Government is certainly not disappearing in the UK or anywhere else, but the context in which governments operate has been transformed, as they grapple with profound challenges arising from globalisation, Europeanisation, the modernisation of the administration and organisation of government, and an evolving constitution. As a result of these changes, governance is becoming more fragmented and diversified and as a result it is much harder for both politicians and citizens to understand the process of governing.
Ontario shares in the problems that this evolving context raises for the delivery of administrative justice, but the province's response has been distinctive, perhaps unique, compared to strategies enacted elsewhere.
The idea behind tribunal clusters in Ontario traces its origins to the Agency Cluster Project, launched in 2006 with the appointment of Kevin Whitaker (now Justice
Whitaker of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice) as facilitator to work with five environmental and land use planning tribunals to explore possibilities for mutual reforms. The project's stated purpose was to identify ways to exploit overlaps between the different tribunals, in order to improve their independence in decision-making, their effectiveness from a user perspective, and their accountability. A key constraint, however, was to achieve these objectives without compromising or collapsing the separate legislative mandates of each constituent tribunal. 5 Further, there appeared to be little appetite in the province for reforms that would alter the jurisdiction of participant tribunals, and thus the Cluster Project was limited to operate within bounds of existing legislative frameworks.
Whitaker's final report introduced the tribunal cluster as 'the grouping together of different tribunals that work in related areas and deal with related subject matter'. 6 The goal of clustering, according to the report, was 'to improve the quality of services offered to the public by sharing resources, expertise and administrative and professional support'. 7 This original vision for tribunal clusters then emerged in the Tribunals Act as a surprisingly open-ended idea. Section 15 of the Act provides that the province may designate two or more adjudicative tribunals as a cluster if 'the matters that the tribunals deal with are such that they can operate more effectively and efficiently as part of a cluster than alone'. 8 But a detailed description both of what a cluster 'is' and any specific criteria that describe when it is appropriate to form a cluster are conspicuously absent from the Tribunals Act. Nor are the rationales behind the cluster concept clarified in the wording of the Act or by nature of the legislative scheme overall. 9 For these, we find it necessary to look further afield.
Specifically, the austerity of the Tribunals Act as drafted raises a key question going
forward: on what basis should individual tribunals be connected within a cluster? In other words, how can we predict when tribunals will operate more 'effectively' and 'efficiently' as part of a cluster than alone? A more complete answer to this question will be crucial for new cluster organisations as they arise and continue to evolve.
To date, the Tribunals Act has borne two clusters markedly different in composition: Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario (ELTO) in April 2010, and Social Justice Tribunals Ontario (SJTO) in January 2011. 10 ELTO brings together five tribunals with overlapping subject matter expertise in land use planning, assessment and expropriation, heritage conservation, and environmental regulation.
SJTO encompasses six tribunals responsible for a diverse range of subject matters but serving a common constituency of users vulnerable to social injustices. Each cluster operates as an independent organisation and is led by its own Executive Chair. As we discuss in more detail below, the differences between these two organisations illustrate that the question of when tribunals should form a cluster is one to be answered with reference to the tribunals' existing capacities and to the goals that each particular cluster is trying to achieve.
That question also leads to-and, to some extent, presupposes-a more basic inquiry into the systemic challenges that clusters are designed to confront. Are these clusters in reality just a convenient cost-saving exercise? Certainly, clustering tribunals may give rise to efficiencies. Rather than four payroll offices or four registrars, a cluster of four tribunals may need only one payroll office and one registrar. Everything from renting space to information technology procurement may be more cost effective for larger clustered tribunals than for smaller individual ones. That said, integrating disparate systems and equipment may also give rise to short term costs. The key point, in our view, is not whether clusters are more efficient than individual tribunals operating in isolation but rather, who benefits? If the savings from clustering are reinvested in enhancing the quality of administrative justice, then the beneficiaries will be the tribunals themselves and, more importantly, the parties who come before them.
If, however, savings are siphoned off into general revenues, then the clustering exercise would indeed be vulnerable to the critique that it is motivated by fiscal rather and qualitative criteria.
We argue that the cluster concept may present an effective, user-focused strategy to address some of the basic challenges of fragmentation that plague modern systems of administrative justice. Clusters share several elements in common with a trend toward system-wide amalgamation pioneered in Australia and recently adapted in the UK, but tribunal clusters also have some unique features of their own. Most significantly, the clustering strategy allows the administrative justice system to retain a certain degree of flexibility and dynamism, with clusters afforded the freedom to develop their own organisational cultures and institutional mandates tailored to the particular needs, demands and capacities of the tribunals' users groups and memberships. The cluster model also motivates tribunals to realise these goals on a continuous basis, rather than locking tribunal organisation into a particular pattern that will be unresponsive to the needs of its user populations in the future.
Tribunal clusters have been contemplated in New Zealand and attempted in at least one instance in the United States, but to our knowledge the cluster concept has not yet been defined in any detail nor has it been the subject of a comparative analysis. 11 We think Ontario's new Tribunals Act offers a good opportunity to do just that. In section B of this paper we address the questions of why tribunal clusters might be useful models for reform and when this strategy should be deployed to connect tribunals within a cluster. We begin by reflecting on some of the core challenges that tribunal modernisation and reform efforts seek to confront, each of which relate to existing patterns of fragmentation in the delivery of administrative justice. We then connect these patterns to some of the basic rationales behind the clustering strategy, and use this context to assess what Ontario's two new tribunal clusters reveal about the basis for
clustering. In section C we examine the tribunal cluster concept in more depth and canvas the various factors that distinguish this approach from other reform strategies.
In section D, we draw on experiences with tribunal amalgamation in Australia to produce some preliminary insights into various techniques that tribunal clusters might employ to realise reform goals, and conclude with our view on the continued evolution of the cluster model toward the ultimate destination of administrative justice.
B MODERNISING TRIBUNAL SYSTEMS
The goal of modernising administrative tribunal systems is ultimately to improve access to justice for users. 12 As the costs associated with traditional court-centred legal processes have grown, so has the popularity of administrative tribunals in the view of both policy makers and various user communities. Individuals are looking to these tribunals as simpler and more economical avenues to review administrative decision making and to resolve their disputes, free from the many formal trappings of the law courts-a trend which is likely to continue as the cost of access grows as a concern, not only for socially and economically disadvantaged individuals but also for the politically significant middle class. 13 Access to justice is, however, a heterogeneous ideal characterised by at least three different dimensions of accessibility relevant to administrative justice reform. 14 The first of these is formal access to the tribunal process itself, as determined by agency rules about legal standing to bring claims and by the procedures that govern how a tribunal conducts its hearings. Second, access to legal or other knowledge relates to whether and how individuals will be able to navigate the tribunal system and obtain services from a given tribunal. This type of access is influenced by operational guidelines and policies, a tribunal's use of language and the availability of translation and assisted services, the ability to self-represent, the simplicity of a tribunal's procedures, and the availability of past decisions to the general public. Third, access to the resources needed to participate in the tribunal system will be a core consideration for many users. The level of resources required for authentic participation in the tribunal system will depend both on the availability of subsidised assistance and on the costs associated with participation, including costs of representation, administration fees, and the rules governing cost awards.
Unfortunately, even while individual administrative tribunals are promoted as simpler, more efficient and more expert in particular subject matters than courts, fragmentation within tribunal systems continues to thwart these basic dimensions of access for users in several ways. 15 Consider the low-income individual in Ontario who faces a challenge in obtaining social benefits and is in a dispute with her landlord. 24 To the extent that fragmentation impairs the public's understanding about available options, potential users might never even find their way to the front door.
Empirical work by Hazel Genn and others also suggests that these barriers to knowledge may disproportionately impact users who belong to marginalised groups. 25 The ad hoc evolution of administrative tribunal systems has likewise created serious discontinuities in how individuals' legal rights are determined and has disrupted the flow of knowledge between adjudicators themselves, 'leading to a lack of consistency and in some cases arbitrary decision-making'. 26 Training standards for tribunal members currently vary widely between different agencies, leading to inconsistent opportunities for members to engage in professional development and learning. In both procedural and substantive dimensions, the current landscape of public administration also makes it difficult for adjudicators with different but interrelated areas of expertise to interact and develop common understandings and approaches.
Combating fragmentation is therefore about more than maximising the efficiencies of resource use; it is also fundamentally about improving the quality and consistency of review to fulfill the guiding principle of procedural fairness.
Fragmentation similarly hinders first-instance decision-makers from learning more effectively from the decisions of review tribunals. A more coherent system would improve the quality of first-instance decisions by facilitating better feedback processes from tribunal adjudication, allowing judgments from all related tribunals to inform administrative decision making in the future. Certainly, some authors have questioned whether appeal decisions issued by tribunals have traditionally had much effect on the quality of first-instance decision making. 27 Addressing the problems associated with fragmentation in the tribunal system may be one response to this disconnect.
Over time, a system that fosters better first-instance decisions will tend to rely less on appeals or judicial review, enhancing access to justice by lowering costs and the time required to achieve a just outcome. Moreover, fragmentation in determining legal rights likely makes it more difficult for tribunals to maintain decision-making independence from their respective ministries. A system of atomised tribunal bodies operating in relative isolation likely creates more opportunities for departmental capture and makes it difficult to impose and regulate the shared principles of transparency and openness that can flow from greater independence.
Responses to Fragmentation in Australia and the UK
Australia and the UK, as two large common law jurisdictions with a shared history of administrative state expansion following the Second World War, provide helpful comparative insights with respect to contemporary reforms in administrative justice.
System-wide reform efforts in these countries have attempted to address the various aspects of fragmentation that plague modern administrative states. The earliest of these initiatives was to establish the federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)
in Australia in 1976 following a pioneering report by the Commonwealth Administrative Review Committee chaired by Sir John Kerr. 28 At that time, the Kerr Committee sketched a picture of an administrative justice system that was uncoordinated, contained many gaps, and was not easily understood by its constituents. 29 The ultimate product of the Committee's report, the Administrative Tribunals Act, created a generalist tribunal to review administrative decisions which today has jurisdiction to conduct merits review under a wide variety of more than 400
Acts of the federal Parliament.
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The AAT also exercises an appellate function with respect to the decisions of a few remaining specialist tribunals in the areas of social security and veterans' benefits. 31 Tribunal system reforms have also received considerable attention in the UK, motivated most recently by Sir Andrew Leggatt's review of the tribunal system in 2001. 34 The Leggatt Report recommended that tribunals in the UK be collected together under one umbrella and administered by a new agency reporting to the Lord Chancellor. 35 That report received a favourable response from the government in its 2004 White
Paper. 36 The White Paper addressed several core concerns raised by Leggatt, including the physical accessibility of tribunal locations, access to process and knowledge, the independence of tribunals from their sponsoring departments and the overall quality of decision-making. The government also noted that some of the barriers inhibiting reform were rooted in current patterns of organisation within the system itself and observed that 'present arrangements are highly fragmented, with each department, agency or tribunal responsible for trying to make improvements within its own sphere of operation'. 37 These concerns proved serious enough to motivate political The two amalgamated tribunal bodies created under the TCEA parallel the Australian reforms in the mid-1970s and subsequent refinements of that model at the State level, although its two-tier structure appears to be unique in some respects.
The new First-tier Tribunal of HMCTS conducts first instance review of the decisions of public administrators. It has acquired the jurisdiction of the bulk of administrative tribunals in the UK, with the notable exception of the system of planning appeals, which remains a distinct process. 41 The Upper Tribunal was established to rationalise the 'haphazard' network of appeal routes from first instance tribunals under the old system, 42 and also exercises statutory jurisdiction to conduct judicial review. Each of these two tribunals retain a degree of specialisation within different 'Chambers', though judges and tribunal members can be cross-appointed between these divisions. Australian government. 44 The outcome for the UK, Cane argues, is a system not unlike that of conventional law courts. Australia, at least at the federal level, has so far resisted this trajectory in favour of model that sees amalgamated tribunal agencies as a 'distinct genus of adjudicatory institution' that seek to maintain their pragmatic advantages in terms of speed, affordability and informality. 45 At root, each of these responses can be understood as attempts to re-imagine individual tribunals as part of a coherent and continuous system of administrative justice.
That perspective has taken some time to catch hold in Canada. According to Heather
McNaughton:
it was not until recently that governments and Canadian courts have started to conceptualise administrative tribunals dealing with such disparate interests as the protection of fundamental human rights, the issuance and transfer of quota for production of agricultural products, and property tax assessment, as being part of a system of justice. 46 One of the authors has traced this emerging view of administrative justice in Canada's Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and the place of administrative decisionmakers within Canada's constitutional order. 47 Michael Adler has labeled this an 'administrative justice approach' which recognises the important role of courts, tribunals, ombudsmen and other external redress mechanisms but also emphasises internal means of enhancing administrative decisions such as recruitment, training and appraisal processes, as well as standard setting and quality assurance systems. 48 That perspective represents a common thread among administrative justice reforms in several jurisdictions internationally. In its White Paper, the UK government acknowledged that 'the sphere of administrative justice . . . embraces not just courts and tribunals but the millions of decisions taken by thousands of civil servants and other officials.' 49 Tribunal reforms should, according to this view, concentrate on more than the final stage of dispute resolution, they should take into account the entire process 'from the initial decision onwards'. 50 A countervailing consideration to whole system reform is that administrative tribunals must retain a degree of flexibility in order to accommodate and support their particular mandates and areas of expertise. McNaughton cautions that '[t]he temptation to one size fits all reforms fails to take into account the fact that the specialist areas delegated to administrative tribunals form the very basis for their existence in the first place.' 51 The main challenge of tribunal reform might thus be seen as an attempt to modernise and rationalise administrative tribunal systems while respecting, maintaining and promoting core principles of accessibility, pragmatism, and expediency.
The key is to make the system coherent while keeping it 'nimble'. and independent reviewers and academics alike to put that proposition to the test.
For example, large-scale amalgamations may trade off flexibility and adaptability within the supertribunal in return for greater conformity across the organisation.
Second, clusters allow for learning across and between tribunals. Tribunals previously in relationships with separate ministries can, in one cluster, highlight the best practices and procedures from each in order to give the cluster a distinct identity. 55 Third, the structure of tribunal clusters may accurately reflect how users actually experience justice problems in some circumstances. National civil legal needs surveys conducted in several countries over the past decade have confirmed that recognisable patterns emerge in the ways that individuals experience multiple issues. 56 The surveys reveal that specific problems tend to cluster together-meaning that, for example, an individual who experiences a housing problem would be more likely to also encounter challenges related disability benefits. 57 Tribunals will adjudicate many of these clustered subject matters. This survey data suggest that tribunal systems might be more effective at addressing administrative justice problems if they are structured 59 But read in context of the pragmatic rationales that underpin clustering and its inherent flexibility as a reform strategy, a more expansive interpretation of the Tribunals Act seems warranted.
Taken as a whole, these rationales imply that the overriding orientation of clustering should be instrumental rather than formalistic-that is, tribunals should be clustered whenever it is 'efficient' and 'effective' to do so. Such an instrumental approach no doubt requires policy makers to consider the subject matter of constituent tribunals in some cases, but also points to the character of tribunals' user communities and to procedural, adjudicatory or administrative similarities as equally significant factors in deciding when it is appropriate to form a tribunal cluster. 60 This approach also raises the interesting question of when it would not be efficient and effective for tribunals to cluster. One answer may be where a tribunal itself is already the product of amalgamation and so enjoys many of the benefits of clustering (for example, the Board. In comparison to ELTO, SJTO's tribunals deal with a much more diverse range of subject matters and most share little in the way of substantive overlap, although some, such as the Custody Review and Child and Family Review Boards, will likely cultivate important subject matter connections. 64 As the SJTO's name itself suggests, a primary motivation behind its formation has been to create a 'single door' institution for a shared community of users vulnerable to social injustice from a range of causes such as discrimination, physical and mental disabilities and economic disadvantage. The SJTO tribunals thus appear to have clustered around the socioeconomic characteristics and other identifying features of users, rather than the particular subject matters dealt with by the tribunals.
Ontario's two existing tribunal clusters indicate that the functional criteria of efficiency and effectiveness will likely have different reference points depending on the circumstances in which the cluster is formed. ELTO's experience reveals that subject matter jurisdiction will be central in some instances, while the new SJTO suggests that common characteristics of the cluster's user communities will be a main focus in others.
The New Zealand Law Commission has suggested that reformers should also pay attention to the nature of tribunals' adjudicatory powers when contemplating how to group like tribunal together. 65 The Commission noted that the core function of some tribunals is to review government decision-making, and distinguished these from other bodies dealing with inter partes disputes.
The Commission's study was careful to observe that the aspirations of each tribunal cluster, as well as the challenges it seeks to address, should shape how that cluster is designed. It also underscored the contested implications of 'expertise'.
Administrative lawyers frequently refer to the expertise of adjudicators in a particular field of knowledge, but rarely acknowledge expertise in certain procedures or techniques. One can imagine situations in which members' specialised knowledge of subject areas converge (perhaps members from different tribunals all have a similar background in land use planning), pulling toward a common set of procedures and practices that would encourage cross-fertilisation between tribunals. But these same members' expertise in specific forms of disputeresolution processes might diverge considerably, favouring more distinct procedural rules for each tribunal within the cluster. Alternatively, the form of dispute-resolution itself, such as an emphasis on inquisitorial processes or ADR techniques, rather than an adversarial approach, could
stand as yet another basis for forming a cluster out of tribunals.
C TRIBUNAL CLUSTER MODELS
Having outlined the basic motivations behind the tribunal cluster model, we next describe the actual structure of tribunal clusters in their various forms. It is useful to situate cluster-type arrangements along a spectrum that ranges from basic physical co-location of like tribunals, to tribunal clusters, to fully integrated tribunal amalgamation. In reality, actual tribunal clusters will tend not to occupy a specific point along this spectrum, but will likely mix and match some features of each approach to create context-specific arrangements.
Co-location
The most basic type of structural reform related to tribunal clusters is the colocation model, whereby tribunals are brought together to share the same physical space and perhaps some overlapping logistical infrastructure. This model normally entails a 'single door' approach that allows users of the co-located tribunals to attend at a single location and gain information about the various procedures from constituent tribunals. On the back-end, co-located tribunals will generally each retain leadership and control over their own affairs, although some efficiencies in administrative collaboration may be available. Given that co-location is basically about logistical reorganisation, this strategy can likely be employed without the need for new legislation authorising the structure. The statutory mandate and membership of each co-located tribunal in this model remain separate from those of other participating tribunals.
In Australia, Robin Creyke has noted both the possibilities and limitations inherent in this approach:
The advantages of the co-location model are that it preserves the status quo, retains the flexibility of a variety of specialist bodies, while permitting cost savings from use of a common registry and administrative infrastructure. The disadvantages are that it perpetuates the complexity and lack of coherence of the system, does not permit further savings other than those involved in co-location, and enhances the possibility of tribunal capture by its respective agency. This first option also denies the possibility for development of an administrative law jurisprudence across tribunals on matters of common interest, such as, for example, the failure to notify citizens of decisions, the minimum content of statements of reasons, the circumstances in which tribunals can revisit their decisions, and when tribunals are estopped from acting. 66 Creyke's assumptions about the limitations of a bare co-location model may hold in circumstances where there is little motivation to cultivate further connections between tribunals, but her analysis appears to be overly pessimistic about opportunities for procedural and substantive innovations insofar as they are applicable to clusters more generally. Creyke's assessment may also gloss over some of the important nuances that can be built into co-location as one aspect of clustering. For example, considerations such as office geography, discussed below, can yield important influences on the ability to share knowledge and practices between tribunals.
While co-located tribunals lack some of the more sophisticated organisational Simple clusters will inevitably prove to be the most straightforward to establish and administer, with minimal disruption of existing tribunals who form part of the cluster.
More complex clusters might contain additional layers or higher-order levels of organisation as a way of variably defining the cluster's connections according to subgroupings. For example, tribunals within a sub-group at one level may share related subject-matter jurisdictions, while that sub-group as a whole might share adjudicatory techniques with other sub-groups in the cluster. Alternatively, levels within a nested cluster might represent increasing areas of generality in subject-matter jurisdiction-for example, between environmental matters at one level and between environment and land-use matters at another. This type of model raises questions about tradeoffs between greater organisational complexity and the ability to define subgroups to create a more fine-grained structure. These sub-groupings may make the process of drawing connections between tribunals more straightforward and coherent, given that the needs and functions of some tribunals will fit more or less comfortably with each of the others in the cluster. However, greater complexity will invariably make the cluster more challenging to lead and administer, may increase cost, and may pose a risk to a unified organisation insofar as subgroupings create the possibility to form sub-cultures that entrench old ways of doing things rather than promote communication and knowledge sharing. Clusters will rarely remain static-rather, they may grow in complexity or composed of two departments dealing with land use and environmental hearings respectively. 70 A preliminary question about the evolution from EHO to ELUHO is whether the environment and land sub-groupings will be largely formal organising concepts or whether this arrangement will have significant practical implications for operating the cluster. The enabling legislation for the new cluster leaves it open as to whether the environment boards will have a common chair or individual chairs. It appears that a Chair responsible for the operation of the cluster as a whole will be appointed from the membership of either the land or environment sections, but that this Chair will not be cross-appointed to sit on tribunals for both sections.
Inevitably, this model raises the spectre of competing visions for the mandate of the cluster-if a Chair from an environmental background is selected, will that suggest to the land use tribunal community that a particular substantive approach will dominate the cluster? In the case of ELTO, Ontario's environment and land tribunal cluster, it is significant that the first Executive Chair was chosen from a background that was in neither the environmental or land use fields. 71 Washington's ongoing experience with tribunal reforms may offer a good opportunity to track the evolution of a cluster model going forward. As we discussed in section B, a key aspect of tribunal clusters is their flexibility to adapt to changing needs and circumstances. ELUHO's recent round of restructuring offers a good illustration of how such clusters might change over time, and underscores the opportunity for further inquiry into the factors that motivate or influence these dynamics and their impact on access to justice for users. While registry staff are divided into teams that service each list individually, tribunalwide managers retain the flexibility to borrow staff from other areas according to workflow demands. 73 The President of the VCAT is a Judge of the Supreme Court. Individuals with legal qualifications dominate the VCAT's membership, and each member is appointed for a five-year fixed-term. Well over half of the VCAT's members are cross-appointed to more than one list. The Tribunal has discretion to regulate its own procedures, making it possible to adapt these to specific proceedings and the requirements of individual Lists. For example, the Guardianship List operates on an informal, inquisitorial basis, while complex tax matters are adjudicated in an adversarial manner, usually involving legal representatives. The VCAT's flexibility to design its own procedures also allows it to implement some uniform operating procedures across the tribunal as a whole in order to promote shared approaches in some areas. In the end, semantic distinctions between broad-scale and generic tribunal clusters like VCAT and unified, or sometimes fragmented, bodies such as ADT are much less significant than the lessons which can be gleaned from studying the implications that flow from their various structural and procedural differences. The purpose of section D is to unpack these various structural components of tribunal clusters.
D LESSONS AND NEXT STEPS
A review of the existing literature on tribunal reform internationally reveals that very little work has been done that evaluates 'best practices' applicable to the cluster concept-either on its own or in comparison to other reform options. In other words, At the outset we can identify a number of general components that are likely to determine the ultimate character of a particular cluster arrangement. In its 2008 study on tribunal reform, the New Zealand Law Commission identified six basic components of cluster models, including: shared administrative support and services, shared membership (ie cross-appointed adjudicators), a common approach to procedures, and a cohesive overall leadership of the cluster. 76 At least one additional feature might be added to this list. Physical co-location is very likely to be a feature of cluster arrangements. Indeed, co-location, as in ELTO's case, may precede a more formal reorganisation of tribunals into a cluster. But additional aspects of the cluster's physical space are also relevant, including office-space geography and the inclusion of shared spaces to increase membership interaction.
We also note two further components of tribunal clusters that are not discussed in detail below, but which we flag for future research: (i) educational mechanisms for crosstraining members who sit on different tribunal within the cluster (as a means of enhancing quality, sharing experience, and developing a shared administrative culture) and (ii) the appointments process by which tribunal members are selected in the first place (so that the needs of the cluster, rather than its constitutive tribunals, may come to guide the process, including a commitment to transparent criteria, an emphasis on cross-appointments or lateral expertise, and an optimal balance of skills and backgrounds).
At a more general level, we assume that tribunal clusters will aim to cultivate a shared organisational culture, which might include an overarching mission/ vision statement and common standards of excellence for tribunals within the group. The accountability documents now required under the Tribunals Act in Ontario require each cluster to develop and make public service standards, publish an MOU with the Government, an annual report and a variety of ethics documents (conflict of interest codes, etc). increased consistency in decisionmaking where members interact frequently to share knowledge and ideas; increased member and staff satisfaction, leading to better productivity; a more functional organisation overall, adherence to a common set of values and shared aims; and an improved public profile for all tribunals or units within the organisation, leading to increased independence from government and greater legitimacy in the public view.
Shared rules, procedures and practices
One way to measure the effectiveness of tribunal clustering for streamlining and improving cluster-wide procedures is to track the diffusion of specific practices within the cluster. Bacon uses the example of how Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
techniques have been adopted and applied within different VCAT Lists following the initial amalgamation. 80 Particular divisions, such as the Planning List, which had previously used mediation practices infrequently saw a dramatic increase in the use of mediation after the VCAT was formed.
Bacon attributes the spread in mediation practice at VCAT to at least three causes.
First, informal member communications were a main source of diffusion, linked to increased opportunities for members to interaction. 81 Second, the VCAT's leadership designed a periodic mediation newsletter to formalise some aspects of information sharing. Third, the VCAT appointed a Principle Mediator with a mandate for promoting the use of mediation throughout the organisation, such as by organising meetings and information sessions and inviting guest speakers to present to the membership.
The 'spread' of these types of practices is a good example of how the idea of institutional memory inherent to the cluster concept can be used to promote positive reforms. For example, those tribunals coming into the cluster with a strong foundation in mediation practices can be tapped as a primary resource for promoting similar practices throughout the cluster. This feature suggests important benefits in the context of Ontario, where ADR practices tend to vary widely between tribunals.
Shared membership and cross appointments
Bacon's research finds at least two benefits of cross-appointing members between tribunal lists or divisions. The primary benefit was that cross-appointments created a means of breaking down some of the cultural barriers between separate subject-matter divisions by encouraging members to share knowledge, be open to new learning, and actively participate in the process of cultural change. The VCAT and ADT diverged widely on this feature, with cross-appointments being far more common in the VCAT.
Bacon attributes much of the VCAT's success to innovations in cross-appointing members.
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Field interviews with tribunal members indicated that changes on this front started small and grew gradually as new norms start to emerge. At the initial stage, crossappointments may simply lead to a greater recognition and comprehension of areas of overlap between units (ie tribunals within a cluster). For example, after VCAT members were cross-appointed to the Guardianship List, these members began to quickly identify guardianship issues in hearings on matters from different lists, particularly when dealing with problems faced by elderly people and people with disabilities in areas such as residential tenancies. Recognition was then followed, over time, with attempts on behalf of members to provide active assistance or direction for those with issues or problems that fell across two or more Lists.
A secondary benefit of cross-appointments is that they are likely to create better incentives to attract high-quality tribunal members. Bacon reports that the ability to sit as a cross-appointed member increased these adjudicators' job satisfaction and contributed to improved career opportunities. There can also be negative impacts, however, from decreasing the number of parttime members. The main challenge flagged in Bacon's research was that full time members in highly specialised areas might find it more difficult to retain their specialised expertise and skills in that field, given that they are unable to be actively involved in actual practice. 84 In professional areas such as engineering and land use planning, this could result in a growing disconnect between full time members' knowledge/experience and the realities faced by the tribunals' constituencies.
Shared administrative support and services
The VCAT and the ADT have apparently been equally successful at developing shared administrative services to suit their particular needs. But notably, positive outcomes such as improved efficiency, better staff training and development, and greater flexibility in mobilizing staff and resources to meet fluctuating workloads appear to be the result of both convergence and divergence at the administrative level. clusters may of course be even greater than those recognised in Bacon's study of the VCAT and the ADT, both of which have been designed in a detailed way to centralise decision-making power around a core executive. The scope of reforms in these jurisdictions, as well as the lens and language of tribunal amalgamation, create a default orientation toward strong leadership. Indeed, at first, the only concrete reality which makes a cluster a cluster may be the appointment of an Executive Chair (Social Justice Tribunals Ontario may be an example of this phenomenon). The nature of leadership roles within a cluster will also depend on the degree to which an Executive Chair is significantly involved in the administration of the tribunals, and on the possibilities for associate chairs of each tribunal to take on aspects of corporate and jurisprudential leadership. 87 For example, in Ontario the Tribunals Act permits the appointment of associate chairs, but does not make them mandatory, implying that the statute does not necessarily predetermine the particular roles of these leadership positions, where they exist, within the cluster. The leadership structure of these clusters will need to reflect evolving administrative and jurisprudential demands, both of the cluster as a whole and of particular tribunals, as they take shape.
To conclude, in the search for best practices, the experience of jurisdictions such as Australia provides tangible direction. Such best practices include: § Shared rules, procedures and practices such as mediation/ADR; § Shared administrative and support services, as well as physical co-location; § Cross-appointments and the development of a common administrative culture; § Strong, cohesive leadership of the organisation.
Given that structural reforms tend to fall along a spectrum (from co-location to tribunal clusters to amalgamation), policy makers should expect that opportunities to learn from experiences in other jurisdictions will continue to arise, even where reform strategies take on different forms. For example, recent changes in the UK, discussed above, may provide yet another comparative Commonwealth model that tribunal clusters can triangulate with as clusters continue to evolve.
We turn now to the conclusion and move from a comparative and empirical analysis of cluster realities on the ground to some preliminary normative reflections on where the evolution of clusters ought to head in Ontario, Canada more broadly, and
elsewhere.
E CONCLUSIONS
The question Ontario's administrative justice and government communities now wrestles with is: 'Why clusters?'
The legislation containing the power to create such clusters, the Tribunals Act, is silent on their purpose. This silence is puzzling. Some clusters may be justified by shared subject matter (such as ELTO), while others may be justified by common qualities among parties before a cluster (such as the rights seekers involved in the SJTO), but neither cluster was handed a mandate in which this rationale, or any rationale, was made apparent.
If you take the problem with administrative justice to be fragmentation, a lack of accessibility, duplication of resources, complexity of mandates and rules, and the lack of structural protections of independence or requirements of accountability, then clusters seem a half-measure at best. Why not bring all adjudicative tribunals together into a single amalgamated structure with different subject-matter sub-divisions, as in the UK? Clusters appear to mitigate rather than solve the problem of tribunals being caught up in ministerial silos, unable to coordinate, learn from each other or engage in economies of scale with respect to accessibility initiatives (like a common pool for translation and interpretation services).
The very existence of a cluster suggests an ambivalence-big is better but not too big! There is, indeed, a quintessentially Canadian dimension to the half-way house of clusters. While clusters are difficult to defend against ideological purists, they reflect the kind of principled pragmatism that has fueled the development of administrative justice in Canada.
The rhetoric surrounding the cluster initiative has cast it as a modernizing project. But the very notion of modernising suggests a process rather than an end point.
While system coherence is a central goal of structural change, it may be overly optimistic to think that we can achieve that goal with a single sweeping set of reforms.
Different tribunals and their groups of users may have different needs at different times, and in our view some degree of flexibility to meet these varying needs is necessary.
We believe that it is impossible to discuss the risks and benefits of tribunal clusters in a normative vacuum. A coherent and coordinated system of administrative justice is better able to deliver access to justice, public accountability and the fulfillment of statutory and policy objectives. It is for this reason that, in our view, clusters represent an important and positive first step, rather than a destination. We acknowledge that this is choosing to see the glass as half-full. Once clusters are in existence, however, if further evolution does not come, all too soon, the glass may come to appear half-empty!
